Law & Economics Working Papers

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive:
2003-2009
University of Michigan Law School

Year 2009

The Obama International Tax Plan: A
Major Step Forward
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
University of Michigan Law School, aviyonah@umich.edu

This paper is posted at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law econ archive/art99

Avi-Yonah:

THE OBAMA INTERNATIONAL TAX PLAN:
A MAJOR STEP FORWARD
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah1

1. Introduction
On May 4, 2009, President Obama in person introduced a set of proposals to reform
U.S. international taxation that are the most significant advance toward preserving the
income tax on cross-border transactions since the enactment of Subpart F by the
Kennedy Administration in 1962. In essence, the Obama proposals (the “Obama
Plan”) introduce a 21st Century version of the vision begun by Thomas Adams in
1918 and continued by Stanley Surrey in 1961: A world in which source and
residence taxation are coordinated so as to achieve the underlying goals of the
international tax regime. As I have explained at length elsewhere, these goals are the
Single Tax Principle (all income from cross-border transactions should be subject to
tax once, not more and not less) and the Benefits Principle (active income should be
taxed primarily at source, passive income primarily at residence).2 The Obama Plan
does this by addressing the central problem of implementing corporate and individual
income taxation in a world of open economies: Effective source taxation requires
residence taxation, and effective residence taxation requires source taxation.
In what follows, I will comment on the major proposals in the Obama Plan and
explain how they form a coherent step forward toward achieving the Single Tax and
Benefit Principles. I will first address the proposals related to the taxation of active
income earned by corporations, and then the proposals related to the taxation of
passive income earned by individuals.
2. Corporate Taxation: Source Taxation Requires Residence Taxation
The taxation of active income earned by multinational enterprises (MNEs) is assigned
by the consensus underlying the international tax regime primarily to the source
country. This makes sense both because the source country provides the benefits that
enable the income to be earned (such as infrastructure and education) and because
active income is earned primarily by corporations and source-based corporate
taxation is more sensible than residence-based taxation because corporate residence is
not very meaningful.
However, as has been recognized by numerous scholars as well as the OECD since
the 1990s, source-based taxation of active income is increasingly difficult because of
tax competition among countries to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In
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addition, various techniques have been developed by MNEs to shift their income
from high tax to low tax jurisdiction either by transfer pricing or by various earnings
stripping techniques (such as thin capitalization and the judicious placing of
intangible assets in tax havens). The result, as the Obama Plan notes at the outset, is
that in 2003 nearly one third of the profits by US-based MNEs were located in
Bermuda, the Netherlands and Ireland, and that of the top ten locations of such profits
seven had effective tax rates of less than 10%.3
In this environment, effective source-based taxation of MNEs requires a backup in
the form of effective residence-based taxation. Since over 90% of the parent
corporations of MNEs are resident in OECD member countries, if all the OECD
countries abolished deferral or exemption of the income of Controlled Foreign
Corporations (CFCs) belonging to “their” MNEs, then tax competition would cease to
be a significant problem and source-based taxation of active income would once
again be possible, just as it was before globalization took off in the 1980s.
The Obama Proposal takes several significant steps in this direction, First, it curtails
the benefit of deferral by limiting deductions (other than R&E deductions) taken by
US-based MNEs on their tax return that are associated with earning income eligible
for deferral until the underlying earnings have been repatriated. This proposal, which
is based on legislation introduced by Chairman Rangel in 2007, is estimated to raise
$60.1 billion between 2011 and 2019.
Since R&E is excluded because of the positive externalities that it generates, the main
deductions affected are interest and various forms of headquarters expenses allocated
to foreign source income. In this context, it is interesting that the Obama Proposal is
silent on whether the worldwide interest allocation enacted in 2004 and currently
scheduled to take effect in 2011 will in fact be implemented (it was eliminated in
Chairman Rangel’s legislation).
The Obama Proposal on deferral is much more conservative than some commentators
envisaged when the idea of reforming deferral was broached in the President’s
Budget. For example, the Treasury Subpart F Report from 2000 (written when Larry
Summers was Secretary and therefore of continued relevance today) suggested a total
repeal of deferral with a lower tax rate for foreign source income, or making deferral
conditional on the effective foreign tax rate (a so-called “low tax inclusion”, the
mirror image on the current high-tax exclusion from Subpart F).4 The Administration
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presumably concluded that these types of proposals would run into too much
opposition from the MNEs in the name of competitiveness.
Second, the Obama Proposal reins in various forms of foreign tax credit abuse such as
foreign tax credit generators (like the ones used by AIG) and transactions that purport
to generate current foreign tax credits while the underlying income is subject to
deferral. While the details are still unclear, the first proposal would focus on granting
foreign tax credits only for taxes that the taxpayer “actually pays,” which presumably
refers to various techniques that use the “technical taxpayer rule” to obtain credits for
taxes economically borne by another party to the transaction. The second proposal
relates to schemes built on the Guardian case, in which the taxpayer used a
Luxembourg form of consolidation to obtain direct credits for taxes paid by a
Luxembourg holding company (which was treated as a branch for US tax purposes)
while maintaining deferral for the underlying earnings in the operating Luxembourg
subsidiary. The IRS has attacked this type of structure in regulations, but the
regulations depend on the use of foreign consolidation, and the same result can be
achieved simply by using a hybrid (US branch, foreign corporation) as the holding
company and a reverse hybrid (US corporation, foreign branch) as the operating
subsidiary. The two foreign tax credit proposals together raise $43 billion from 2011
to 2019. These revenues and the revenues from curtailing deferral are used to finally
make the R&E credit permanent (which costs $74.5 billion over the same ten years).
Third, the Obama Proposal revives Notice 98-11 by preventing MNEs from abusing
“check the box” to make flows of passive income between CFCs disappear for
Subpart F purposes. As the Proposal explains, if a US parent has a CFC in the
Caymans with two second tier subsidiaries in Germany and in the Caymans, and the
second tier Caymans sub makes a loan to the German sub, it is currently possible to
avoid Subpart F inclusion of the interest paid from Germany to the Caymans by
making both second tier subs appear to be branches of the Caymans holding
company. Since you cannot lend money to yourself, the result is no loan and no
interest income, but the interest deduction is still effective to transfer profits from
Germany to the Caymans. This provision raises a whopping $86.5 billion from 2011
to 2019 (indicating that in the Administration’s view MNEs cannot achieve the same
result without relying on “check the box”, as they argued successfully in 1997 in
support of the “check the box” rule).5
This is essentially the same as Example 2 of Notice 98-11, and the MNEs would no
doubt object like they did in 1998 that the only tax avoided is the German tax. But
double non-taxation violates the Single Tax Principle, which has been an underlying
idea of the US international tax regime since 1918. As Thomas Adams stated when
explaining why the US uses a foreign tax credit rather than an exemption to prevent
double taxation, “the state which with a fine regard for the rights of the taxpayer takes
5
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pains to relieve double taxation, may fairly take measures to ensure that the person or
property pays at least one tax."
The MNEs would no doubt argue that these steps to enhance residence-based taxation
adversely impact their competitiveness. But they have been making the same
argument since 1961, with no regard to the actual competitive position of US-based
MNEs (in 1961, they dominated the world) and without any evidence that any of the
changes to US international tax rules in the last 48 years have in fact adversely
affected them.
A more serious concern is that these parts of the Obama Plan would induce US-based
MNEs to migrate their headquarters to other locations with laxer rules, and that new
businesses that are run from the US would be established with foreign parent
companies. The anti-inversion rules enacted in 2004 establish some defense against
the first threat but are ineffective against the second.6 Because of this I would suggest
that Congress enact the “managed and controlled” provision of Sen. Levin and Rep.
Doggett’s Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, which would treat as a US resident any
corporation that is publicly traded or has over $50 million in assets and that is not a
CFC if its actual management is in the United States. I doubt that too many CEOs of
US-based parents would actually be willing to move to tax havens in response (since
the level of services in the havens is commensurate with the level of taxation).
In the longer term, I would urge the Obama Administration to seek to curtail deferral
further in cooperation with the OECD. If all OECD countries acted in unison to
abolish deferral, then tax competition could be eliminated without any threat to the
competitiveness of US-based MNEs. The Obama Plan is a helpful first step in this
direction, and could be used as a way of persuading other OECD members to follow
suit (like they did for example in prohibiting foreign bribes by their MNEs after the
US enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
Corporations should be taxed primarily at source, and one can imagine an ideal world
of purely source-based corporate taxation (if transfer pricing and other forms of
shifting income are taken care of).7 But in a world of open economies source-based
corporate taxation must be backed up by residence-based corporate taxation, because
otherwise tax competition and artificial income shifting lead to no corporate taxation
at all (Intel notoriously pays not a penny in tax outside the US, and the overall
effective tax rate of US-based MNEs on foreign source profits is very low). The
corporate provisions of the Obama Plan are an important first step in preserving the
US corporate tax base from erosion, and help level the playing field between USbased MNEs and purely domestic businesses subject to the full 35% US corporate tax
rate.

6
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3. Individual Taxation: Residence Taxation Requires Source Taxation
The recent UBS saga has shown that effective residence-based taxation of US
individual citizens and residents is impossible in the absence of US source taxation of
foreigners. Beginning with the enactment of the portfolio interest exemption in 1984,
the US has engaged in a race to the bottom designed to attract residents of other
countries to invest their funds in the US without having to report the income to their
home jurisdiction. Thus, we permit such foreign residents to earn investment income
from US sources without meaningful withholding (capital gains, interest and royalties
are exempt, and dividends can be replaced with dividend substitutes) and without the
US payor having any information about the real identity of the payee (interest can be
paid directly to tax haven corporations, while royalties and dividends can be paid to
Qualified Intermediaries, and in both cases the US withholding agent will not know
who the real payee is).
The problem, as the UBS case revealed, is that these rules enable US residents to also
earn US source investment income without paying any tax on it. The provisions that
are designed to prevent this, such as legends on bearer certificates and audits of
Qualified Intermediaries by foreign auditors, do not work.
The Obama Plan contains several helpful provisions designed to prevent US residents
from evading US taxation. The Plan constructs a dichotomy between investors
through Qualified Intermediaries (QIs) and other investors. In the case of QIs—
The Administration’s plan would increase the reporting requirement on
international investors and financial institutions, especially QIs. QIs would be
required to report information on their U.S. customers to the same extent that U.S.
financial intermediaries must. And U.S. customers at QIs would no longer be
allowed to hide behind foreign entities. U.S. investors would be required to report
transfers of money or property made to or from non-QI foreign financial
institutions on their income tax returns. Financial institutions would face
enhanced information reporting requirements for transactions that establish a
foreign business entity or transfer assets to and from foreign financial accounts on
behalf of U.S. individuals.
In the case of investors through non-QIs, the Obama Proposals would (a) impose a
withholding tax of 20-30% on US-source payments to individuals who use non-QIs,
refundable upon a showing that the true recipient is a non-US resident, (b) create a
rebuttable presumption that any foreign account held by the US citizen at a non-QI is
subject to FBAR, and (c) increase penalties and extend the statute of limitations.
In addition, the line between QIs and non-QIs would be enforced by requiring all
affiliates of a QI to be QIs. These proposals together raise only a modest $8.7 billion
over ten years, a far more conservative estimate than others have suggested for
similar proposals (e.g., the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act).
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This solution is similar to the EU Savings Directive in that it relies on information
exchange (in the case of QIs) and refundable withholding (in the case of non-QIs). In
principle it should work, but the devil is in the details. For example, how will the QI
rules be effectively enforced in the face of foreign bank secrecy claims such as those
currently advanced by UBS?
Another issue is that the non-QI rules only apply to US-source income, but many
types of investment income that economically is US-source is treated as non-US
source under current rules. For example, capital gains are sourced to the residence of
the seller (who will purport to be a foreign investor), and dividend substitutes under
equity swaps are sourced to the residence of the recipient.8
Still, the Obama Plan is definitely a step in the right direction towards enforcing
residence-based taxation on US citizens and residents. Enacting the Stop Tax Haven
Abuse Act, which has the support of the Obama Administration, would be another
advance toward the same goal. Further steps require cooperation by other countries,
lest they induce investor flight from the US. The key observation here is that funds
cannot remain in tax havens and be productive; they must be reinvested into the
prosperous and stable economies of the world (which is why some laundered funds
that need to remain in the tax havens earn a negative interest rate). If the rich
countries could agree, they could eliminate the tax havens’ harmful activities
overnight by, for example, imposing a refundable withholding tax (e.g., at 35%) on
all payments to noncooperating tax havens, or more broadly, to all nontreaty
countries, and insisting on effective automatic exchange of information with treaty
countries. The withholding tax would be refunded upon a showing that the income
was reported to the residence country. This idea is similar to, but much broader than,
the refundable withholding tax proposal in the Obama Plan.9
The financial services industry would no doubt lobby hard against such a step, on the
grounds that it would induce investors to shift funds to other OECD member
countries. However, the EU and Japan have both committed themselves to taxing
their residents on foreign-source interest income. The EU Savings Directive, in
particular, requires all EU members to cooperate in exchange of information or
impose a withholding tax on interest paid to EU residents. Both the EU and Japan
would like to extend this treatment to income from the United States. Thus, this
would seem an appropriate moment to cooperate with other OECD member countries
by imposing a withholding tax on payments to tax havens that cannot be induced to
cooperate in exchanging information, without triggering a flow of capital out of the
OECD.
Fundamentally, in a globalized world with open economies, residence taxation of individuals
is impossible without source-based taxation, because in the absence of source taxation the
information required to ensure residence taxation is not available. The Obama Plan
8

This problem can be solved if dividend substitutes are treated as dividends, as envisaged by the Stop Tax
Haven Abuse Act.
9
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, A Coordinated Withholding Tax On Deductible Payments, Shelf Project Proposal,
119 Tax Notes 993 (June 2, 2008).

http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art99

6

6

Avi-Yonah:

recognizes this reality and is a major step forward toward achieving taxation of US citizens
and residents based on their true ability to pay.

4. Conclusion
As the President stated in introducing the Obama Plan,
Nobody likes paying taxes, particularly in times of economic stress. But most
Americans meet their responsibilities because they understand that it's an
obligation of citizenship, necessary to pay the costs of our common defense and
our mutual well-being.
And yet, even as most American citizens and businesses meet these
responsibilities, there are others who are shirking theirs. And many are aided and
abetted by a broken tax system, written by well-connected lobbyists on behalf of
well-heeled interests and individuals. It's a tax code full of corporate loopholes
that makes it perfectly legal for companies to avoid paying their fair share. It's a
tax code that makes it all too easy for a small number of individuals and
companies to abuse overseas tax havens to avoid paying any taxes at all. And it's
a tax code that says you should pay lower taxes if you create a job in Bangalore,
India, than if you create one in Buffalo, New York.
Now, understand, one of the strengths of our economy is the global reach of our
businesses. And I want to see our companies remain the most competitive in the
world. But the way to make sure that happens is not to reward our companies for
moving jobs off our shores or transferring profits to overseas tax havens. This is
something that I talked about again and again during the course of the campaign.
The way we make our businesses competitive is not to reward American
companies operating overseas with a roughly 2 percent tax rate on foreign profits;
a rate that costs taxpayers tens of billions of dollars a year. The way to make
American businesses competitive is not to let some citizens and businesses dodge
their responsibilities while ordinary Americans pick up the slack.
The Obama Plan for reforming US international tax rules is incomplete, and it will no
doubt be much amended in Congress. But it represents a crucial first step that is based
on the realization that in our interdependent world, it is not possible to achieve either
source or residence-based taxation without the other form being effectively
implemented. And that without taxing cross-border income, all income taxation
becomes impossible, because income taxation requires taxing capital and capital is
mobile across borders. If we want to preserve the income tax and retain some
progressivity in our tax system, the Obama Plan should be enacted as soon as
possible.
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